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Abstract—Recently, the k-induction algorithm has proven to
be a successful approach for both finding bugs and proving
correctness. However, since the algorithm is an incremental
approach, it might waste resources trying to prove incorrect
programs. In this paper, we propose to extend the k-induction
algorithm in order to shorten the number of steps required
to find a property violation. We convert the algorithm into
a meet-in-the-middle bidirectional search algorithm, using the
counterexample produced from over-approximating the program.
The preliminary results show that the number of steps required to
find a property violation is reduced to ⌊ k
2
+1⌋ and the verification
time for programs with large state space is reduced considerably.
I. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems are used in a variety of applications,
ranging from nuclear plants and automotive systems to enter-
tainment and games [1]. This ubiquity drives a need to test and
validate a system before releasing it to the market, in order to
protect against system failures. Even subtle system bugs can
have drastic consequences, such as the recent Heartbleed bug
on OpenSSH, which might have leaked private information
from several servers [2].
One promising technique to validate a system is called
bounded model checking (BMC) [3]. The basic idea of BMC
is to check the negation of a property at a given depth:
given a transition system M , a property φ, and a bound k,
BMC unrolls the system k times and generates verification
conditions (VC) ψ, such that ψ is satisfiable if and only if φ
has a counterexample of depth k or less. BMC tools based on
Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) or Satisfiability Module Theories
(SMT) have been applied on the verification of both sequential
and parallel programs [4], [5], [6]. However, BMC tools are
aimed to find bugs; they cannot prove correctness, unless the
bound k safely reaches all program states.
Despite the fact that BMC cannot prove correctness by itself
(unless it fully unwinds the program), there are algorithms
that use BMC as a “component” to prove correctness. In
particular, the k-induction algorithm is an incremental algo-
rithm that aims to find bugs and prove correctness using
an ever increasing number of unwindings. In this paper, we
propose to extend the algorithm originally developed for k-
induction to shorten the number of iterations required to find
a property violation. Our main original contribution is an
extension to the k-induction algorithm, which converts the
algorithm into a meet-in-the-middle bidirectional search by
using the counterexample generated by the inductive check
(Section III). The preliminary results show that the number of
steps required to find a property violation is reduced to ⌊k
2
+1⌋
and the verification time for programs with large state space
is reduced considerably (Section IV).
II. THE k-INDUCTION ALGORITHM
The first version of the k-induction algorithm was proposed
by Sheeran et al. [7]; they apply BMC to find bugs and prove
correctness. BMC tools cannot prove correctness unless the
bound k is appropriate to reach the completeness threshold
(i.e., a value that will fully unroll all loops occurring in the
program, often impractically large [8]). For instance, consider
the simple program shown in Figure 1, the assertion in line 8
always holds, regardless of the initial value of n in line 2.
BMC tools as CBMC [4], ESBMC [5] or LLBMC [9] typically
produce the program in Figure 2 and are unable to verify that
program unless the loop is fully unrolled, i.e., the unwinding
assertion if k < 232 − 1 in 32-bit and 64-bit architectures.
1 int main() {
2 uint32_t n;
3 uint64_t sn = 0;
4 for (uint64_t i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
5 sn = sn + 2;
6 assert(sn == i * 2);
7 }
8 assert(sn == n*2 || sn == 0);
9 }
Fig. 1. Simple loop program.
In mathematics, one usually approaches such class of
problems using proof by induction. The k-induction variant
has been successfully combined with continuously-refined
invariants [10], was used to prove that C programs do not
contain data races [11], or that design time constraints are
respected [12]; it is a well-established technique in hardware
verification, where it is applied due to the monolithic transition
relation present in hardware designs [7], [13].
We define the k-induction algorithm as an iterative deep-
ening search algorithm [14]. Let a given program under
verification P be a finite transition system m with branching
factor b and depth d (we use b+ to represent the overap-
proximated branch factor, such that b ⊆ b+, and d+ to
represent the overapproximated depth, such that d ⊆ d+),
1 int main() {
2 uint32_t n;
3 uint64_t sn = 0;
4 uint64_t i = 1;
5 if(i <= n) {
6 sn = sn + 2;


k copies7 assert(sn == i * 2);
8 i++;
9 }
10 assert(!(i<=n)); // unwinding assertion
11 assert(sn == n*2 || sn == 0);
12 }
Fig. 2. Finite k unwindings done by BMC.
I(sn) and T (sn, sn+1) be the formulae for the initial states
and transition relations form over propositional state variables
sn and sn+1, Φ be the set of safety properties, φ(s) ∈ Φ be
the formula encoding for states satisfying a safety property
and ψ(s) be the formula encoding for states satisfying the
completeness threshold. We also define a counterexample as a
sequence of states [s1, . . . , sk] of length k that violates a safety
property. The k-induction algorithm is a complete and optimal
(always find the shortest counterexample) search algorithm,
with complexity O(bd) and state space O(b+d+). Jovanovic´
et al. [15] prove that k-induction can be more powerful and
concise than regular induction.
In each step k of the k-induction algorithm, three checks
are performed: the base case B(k), forward condition F (k)
and inductive step I(k), for k = [1, d] [16]. The base case
B(k) is the standard BMC and B(k) is satisfiable if and only
if B(k) has a counterexample of length k or less [17]:
B(k) = I(s1) ∧
k∨
i=1
i−1∧
j=1
T (sj, sj+1) ∧ ¬φ(si). (1)
The second check, the forward condition F (k), checks if
the completeness threshold ψ(s) holds for the current k. This
is established by checking if the following is unsatisfiable:
F (k) = I(s1) ∧
k∨
i=1
i−1∧
j=1
T (sj , sj+1) ∧ ¬ψ(sk). (2)
No safety property φ(s) is checked in F (k) as they were
already checked for the current k in the base case. Finally,
the inductive step I(k), checks if whenever φ(s) holds in k
states s1, . . . , sk, φ(s) also holds for the next state sk+1. This
is established by checking if the following is unsatisfiable:
I(k) =
k−1∧
j=1
T (sj, sj+1) ∧ φ(si) ∧ ¬φ(sk). (3)
Combining the three checks, the k-induction algorithm at a
given k is:
kind(P, k) =


P contains a bug, if ¬B(k)
P is correct, if F (k) ∨ I(k)
kind(P, k + 1), otherwise.
(4)
III. EXTENDING THE k-INDUCTION ALGORITHM
The k-induction algorithm is being applied to solve a
number of different verification problems, but the algorithm
has limitations, that our work addresses. The biggest limitation
is the fact that if a state ξ violates a property at depth k, the
algorithm requires k steps to find the counterexample. This
is expensive because of the three checks performed for each
k. The inductive check is the most computationally expensive
of the three checks; it is an overapproximation, forcing the
SMT solver to find a set of assignments in a larger state space
than the original program [16]. Moreover, the computation is
wasted if a counterexample is found by the inductive check,
as it is assumed to be spurious.
In order to address the problem of the wasted computation
and of the k iterations, we propose to use the counterexample
generated by the inductive check, to speed up the bug finding
check (the base case). By reusing the counterexample found
by the inductive check, we aim to cut the number of required
k steps to find a bug in half.
The main idea is to search simultaneously both forward
(from the initial state s1) and backward (from the error state
ξ) and stop if the two searches meet in the middle. Assuming
that the error state is reachable in k steps from the initial state,
the solution will be found in ⌊k
2
+ 1⌋, because the forward
and backward searches each have to go only half way (b is
the branching factor) [14].
Our extension aims to convert the k-induction algorithm
into a bidirectional search algorithm, by using the base case
as the forward part and the inductive step as the backward
part. The algorithm will still be complete and optimal, and
the state space explored is much smaller than O(b+d+) as the
number of states and transition relations evaluated by each
step is smaller. Note that the extension repurposes the goal
of the inductive check, from proving correctness to find paths
that lead to error states.
Figure 3 is a visual representation of the proposed extension,
for a given set of states s1 . . . sn and an error state ξ. In this
representation, each k step of the k-induction algorithm verifies
up to k levels in the graph.
The base case is the forward part of the algorithm, it tries
to find a counterexample [s1,. . . ,ξ] of length k. The inductive
check is the backward part of the algorithm; as defined by
Equation 3, the inductive check tries to find a counterexample
[s, . . . , ξ] of length k, from anywhere in the graph.
The counterexample produced by the inductive check is
then a path that leads to a property violation; if at least one
state of this path is reachable from the initial state s1, then
the error state ξ is reachable from the initial state s1. Given
a counterexample [s, . . . , ξ] from the inductive check, our
extension translates that into a new safety property ϕ(si, s):
ϕ(si, s) =
{
1, if si = s
0, otherwise.
(5)
Note that we do not check if a given state si is in a
counterexample [s, . . . , ξ], but rather check if the given state
si is the first state of the counterexample. Given the optimal
nature of the algorithm, this is sufficient to find the property
s1
s2 s3
s4 s5 s6
...
sn−9 sn−8 sn−7
sn−6 sn−5
sn−4 sn−3 sn−2 ξ
sn−1 sn
k = 1
k = 2
k = 3
k = d− 3
k = d− 2
k = d− 1
k = d
B(k)
I(k)
Fig. 3. Visual representation of our proposed extension. Each dashed section
represents the states reachable after k iterations. The arrows show the
“direction” of the verification by the base case B(k) and the inductive check
I(k). The forward condition F (k) is not shown in this representation but it
is a forward check, similar to B(k).
violation. The new safety property is then checked in the new
base case B′(k):
B′(k) = I(s1) ∧
k∨
i=1
i−1∧
j=1
T (sj, sj+1) ∧ ¬φ(si) ∧ ¬ϕ(si). (6)
The computational complexity added to the k-induction
algorithm by our extension is minimal, as it only adds new
property checks to the base case. The inductive check, the
most computationally expensive check, remains unaltered by
our extension. The extended k-induction is also sound: if the
counterexample generated by the inductive is spurious, no state
in the sequence will be reachable from the initial state.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the extension to the k-induction al-
gorithm, we selected a number of benchmarks from the In-
ternational Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP)
2017 [18]. We compare the results from the original k-
induction and our extended version. The programs evaluated
by our extension were manually changed to add the invariants
generated by the inductive step.
A. Description of the Benchmarks
The benchmarks called sum0* are similar to the program
in Figure 1, but contain a bug in different depths. The
benchmarks rangesum* check if a function is “deterministic”
w.r.t. all possible permutations of an input array; the number
in the benchmark name represents the size of the array. The
benchmark const false checks if a constant holds after 1024
iterations (but checks the wrong value after the iterations);
diamond checks if a counter that is being nondeterministically
incremented is even after 99 iterations; and Problem01 label15
is the representation of a reactive system.
All experiments were conducted on a computer with an Intel
Core i7-2600 running at 3.40GHz and 24GB of RAM under
Fedora 25 64-bit. We used ESBMC v4.5 [5] and no time or
memory limit were set for the verification tasks.
B. Objectives
RQ1 (performance) does the extended k-induction require
less resources than the original k-induction, w.r.t. time
and memory?
RQ2 (sanity) Does the extended k-induction provide any
incorrect result?
C. Results
Table I shows the preliminary results obtained from the
original k-induction and our proposed extension. Here, L is
the number of lines in the program, T ime is the time needed
to verify the program in seconds, Mem is the memory used
by the tools to verify the programs in megabytes1 and k is the
number of steps needed to find the bug. The last lines show the
average and cumulative numbers for each of the columns. We
order the benchmarks in relation to the memory required by
the original k-induction. The best results are marked in bold.
The first noticeable aspect of the results is that the time
of the verification is not related to the number of steps or
the program size. The closest relation between the verification
time is the state space explored by each step (more specifically
the inductive check), the bigger the state space, longer it will
take to find a solution; this can somehow be summarized by
memory used by the tool during the verification.
The evaluation for this set of benchmarks show that our
extension to the k-induction algorithm potentially cuts the
verification time considerably in cases where the state space
explored is large. For small cases (e.g., the sum0* false-
unreach-call.c benchmarks), our extension does not slow down
or uses more memory than the original k-induction and for
large cases, the gains were substantial (the verification time of
rangesum60 false-unreach-call.c was 504x faster). In terms of
the steps needed to find the bug, the extended version of the
k-induction required ⌊k
2
+ 1⌋, as expected.
For each benchmark, the verification time and memory
usage is either equal or smaller, compared to the original k-
induction, and thus affirm RQ1. Regarding the results (known
to contain bugs as they are part of the SV-COMP), the ex-
tended k-induction provided the same results that the original
k-induction provided, positively answering RQ2.
V. RELATED WORK
The extension proposed in this paper is basically a form
of target enlargement, where a target state s is “enlarged” by
precomputing the set of states that may hit s in k-steps. Here,
we analyse two works in that direction.
Bischoff et al. [19] propose a methodology to use BDDs
and SAT solvers for the verification of programs. The BDDs
1We used the command /usr/bin/time -v from linux to measure both
the time and the memory usage
Benchmark k-induction Extended k-induction
L T ime (s) Mem (MB) k T ime(s) Mem(MB) k
sum04 false-unreach-call.c 19 1 38.7 9 1 38.7 6
sum01 false-unreach-call.c 18 1 38.9 11 1 38.8 6
sum03 false-unreach-call.c 25 3 39.1 11 1 38.8 6
diamond false-unreach-call1.c 24 13 43.6 51 6 39.1 26
rangesum false-unreach-call.c 64 7 66.2 4 1 39.0 2
rangesum05 false-unreach-call.c 59 11 72.3 6 1 65.4 3
rangesum10 false-unreach-call.c 59 28 78.2 11 16 47.5 6
Problem01 label15 false-unreach-call.c 594 7 87.3 5 5 70.3 4
rangesum20 false-unreach-call.c 59 101 99.9 21 26 78.2 12
rangesum40 false-unreach-call.c 59 847 269.5 41 90 113.9 22
const false-unreach-call1.c 20 2606 796.6 1024 890 253.2 513
rangesum60 false-unreach-call.c 59 80272 1106.9 61 159 134.6 32
Average 88 6991 228.1 104 99 79.79 53
Total 1059 83897 2737.2 1255 1197 957.5 638
TABLE I
PRELIMINARY RESULTS OVER THE SV-COMP BENCHMARKS.
are responsible for the target enlargement, collecting the
under-approximate reachable state sets, followed by the SAT-
based verification with the newly computed sets. The authors
implemented the technique in the Intel BOolean VErifier
(BOVE) and showed that the time was up to five times smaller.
Compared to this work, we only use k-induction and SMT
solvers; the inductive check in the k-induction algorithm is
responsible for enlarging the target and the SMT solver checks
for satisfiability.
Jovanovic´ et al. [15] present a reformulation of IC3, sepa-
rating the reachability checking from the inductive reasoning.
They further replace the regular induction algorithm by the k-
induction algorithm and show that it provides more concise
invariants. The authors implemented the algorithm in the
SALLY model checker using Yices2 to do the forward search
and MathSAT5 to do the backward search. They showed that
the new algorithm is able to solve a number of real-world
benchmarks, at least as fast as other approaches. Compared to
this work, our proposed extended k-induction uses consequent
BMC calls to find a solution. We also implement our approach
independent of solvers and it can be used with any SMT solver
supported by ESBMC; however, both searches will be done
with the same solver.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, our main contribution is a novel extension to
the k-induction algorithm, to perform a bidirectional search
instead of the conventional iterative deepening search. The
extension is currently under development using ESBMC.
We plan to evaluate the improvement over the SV-COMP
benchmarks, where the original k-induction algorithm already
proved to be the state-of-art, if compared to other k-induction
tools [18].
The preliminary results show that the extension has the
potential to substantially improve the verification time for
problems with large state space, while maintaining a small
verification time for small programs. In one particularly large
program (in terms of state space), our extension allowed the
k-induction algorithm to find the property violation on average
using half of the steps and a fraction of the resources.
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